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The Real World of Arbitrariness Review
Thomas J. Miles* and Cass R. Sunstein**

Abstract
The Administrative Procedure Act instructs federal courts to invalidate agency decisions
that are “arbitrary” or “capricious.” In its 1983 decision in the State Farm case, the Supreme
Court firmly endorsed the idea that arbitrariness review requires courts to take a “hard look” at
agency decisions. The hard look doctrine has been defended as a second-best substitute for
insistence on the original constitutional safeguards; close judicial scrutiny is said to discipline
agency decisions and to constrain the illegitimate exercise of discretion. In the last two decades,
however, hard look review has been challenged on the plausible but admittedly speculative
ground that judges’ policy preferences affect judicial decisions about whether agency decisions
are “arbitrary.” This study, based on an extensive data set, finds that the speculation is correct.
Democratic appointees are far more likely to vote to invalidate, as arbitrary, conservative agency
decisions than liberal agency decisions. Republican appointees are far more likely to invalidate,
as arbitrary, liberal agency decisions than conservative agency decisions. Significant panel
effects are also observed. Democratic appointees show especially liberal voting patterns on allDemocratic panels; Republican appointees show especially conservative voting patterns on allRepublican panels. Our central findings do not show that judicial votes are dominated by
political considerations, but they do raise grave doubts about the claim that hard look review is
operating as a neutral safeguard against the errors and biases of federal agencies. Because
judicial policy commitments are playing a large role, there is a strong argument for reducing the
role of those commitments, and perhaps for softening hard look review.
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I. Introduction
In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal courts of appeals, above all the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, developed the “hard look
doctrine.”1 The doctrine found its origins in judicial decisions requiring administrative
agencies to demonstrate that they had taken a “hard look” at the underlying questions of
policy and fact.2 Hence agencies were required to offer detailed, even encyclopedic
explanations for their conclusions; to respond to counterarguments; to justify departures
from past practices; and to give careful consideration to alternatives to the proposed
course of action.3 These were procedural requirements, to be sure, but they had
significant effects, often shifting regulatory policy in identifiable directions by (for
example) discouraging the approval of nuclear power plants4 and generally leading
agencies to give heightened attention to environmental protection.5 Eventually courts
went well beyond these procedural requirements to take a hard look on their own,
assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s judgments of policy and fact on their
merits.6
The goal of hard look review was to police agency decisions for genuine
arbitrariness,7 not to allow federal judges to impose their own policy preferences on the
administrative state. Indeed, a central point of judicial review was to respond to the openended delegation of discretionary power by ensuring a firm check on agency decisions
that might be “irrational or discriminatory.”8 On this view, the hard look doctrine might
be seen as a second-best substitute for the original constitutional safeguards against the
uncontrolled exercise of discretion. Judicial scrutiny of agency judgments of policy and
1

For an influential and well-known example, see Ethyl Corp v. EPA, 541 F2d 1 (DC Cir 1976)
See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U Pa L Rev 509
(1974).
3
All of these requirements can be found in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 US 29 (1983); in the same vein, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947
F.2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991).
4
See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts’ Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 Harv
L Rev 1833 (1978).
5
See William Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 84 Yale LJ 59 (1975). For an early and
illustrative signal of the intended effect of judicial review in the environmental domain, see Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Committee v AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (DC Cir 1971).
6
See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971); Ethyl Corp v. EPA, 541 F2d 1
(DC Cir 1976) (en banc).
7
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 US at 406-410.
8
See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 68 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
2

2

fact might even serve as a method for reducing factional power over government, in a
way that would recall longstanding concerns about the problems posed by the exercise of
authority by self-interested private groups.9
As it developed, however, the hard look doctrine became highly controversial.10
Some of the controversy involved its likely effects. Would the doctrine discourage
agency action altogether, and therefore freeze the status quo, rather than improving
agency decisions11? Some of the controversy involved its legal foundations. Was hard
look review an illegitimate creation of the federal courts12? What provision of law
authorized federal judges to impose these various requirements on agencies, or to give
careful scrutiny to the merits13? Independent questions lay in the background: Would
judicial biases distort the inquiry into reasonableness14? Might judicial judgments reflect
not an assessment of irrationality or discrimination, but the judges’ own policy
commitments?
In its seminal decision in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co.,15 the Court entrenched hard look review and clarified its foundations. The
Court rooted its analysis in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act,16 which
requires courts to strike down agency action found to be “arbitrary” or “capricious.”17
According to the Court, a decision would count as arbitrary if “the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”18 These words, quoted hundreds
9

See The Federalist No. 10 (Madison).
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Fact, 38 Admin l Rev 363 (1986);
Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, The Challenge of Auto Safety (1985); Peter Strauss, Revisiting Overton
Park, 39 UCLA L Rev 1251 (1992).
11
See Mashaw and Harfst, supra note.
12
For discussion, see Clark Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A
Somewhat Different View, 91 Harv L Rev 1823 (1978).
13
The question is raised in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 US 519 (1978).
14
See Ethyl Corp v. EPA, 541 F2d 1, 66-67 (DC Cir 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (noting the risk that
aggressive judicial review will “compound the error of the panel in making legislation policy
determinations alien to its true function”).
15
463 US 29 (1983).
16
5 USC 702.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 43.
10
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of times in federal court decisions,19 were widely taken to ratify both procedural and
substantive components of the hard look doctrine.20
Many agency decisions, including those of the National Labor Relations Board,
are subject to review as lacking “substantial evidence.” In its 1951 decision in Universal
Camera, the Court emphasized that the substantial evidence test of the National Labor
Relations Act21and the Administration Procedure Act22 was “a response to pressures for
stricter and more uniform practice,” embodying a legislative “mood” in favor of
increased judicial “responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board
decisions.”23 In practice, and especially in the aftermath of State Farm, review under the
substantial evidence standard is probably the same as under the arbitrary and capricious
standard,24 though it is sometimes thought that judicial review for substantial evidence is
somewhat more searching.25
Since State Farm, the Court has issued no major pronouncements about judicial
review of allegedly arbitrary agency action, and the doctrine has remained essentially
stable for over two decades.26 But the controversies that preceded the decision have

19

In fact these words have been quoted in no fewer than 572 cases as of April 23, 2007. LEXIS search,
federal courts database, April 23, 2007.
20
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Supreme Court Review 471.
21
29 USC 160(e).
22
5 USC 706(E).
23
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 US 474 (1951).
24
On the substantial evidence test, see Allentown Mack Sales and Service v NLRB, 522 US 359 (1998);
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 US 474 (1951). Some provisions of the environmental statutes also
call for substantial evidence review. The claim that there is no difference between the substantial evidence
test and arbitrariness review is reflected in the fact that the legislative history of the statute in State Farm
suggested that agency findings must be reviewed under the substantial evidence test. See 463 US at 39
(referring to substantial evidence test suggested by legislative history). By emphasizing the “arbitrary or
capricious” test, the Court seemed to suggest that the substantial evidence test was essentially identical.
25
State Farm is best taken as adopting the call for searching review issued long before in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971).
26
For a representatively minor pronouncement, at least on the general operation of arbitrariness review, see
Verizon Communications v. FCC, 535 US 467 (2002). The most important ruling, involving substantial
evidence review, may well be Allentown Mack Sales and Service v. NLRB, 522 US 359 (1998), which did
seem to suggest an unusually aggressive approach; but that decision has not spurred significant rethinking
in the lower courts.
The absence of a major ruling from the Court is itself something of a mystery. Why have we not seen
large-scale developments from the Supreme Court in nearly a quarter-century? The answer may well lie in
the fact that arbitrariness review is typically focused on specific questions of fact and policy, which makes
Supreme Court review less likely, and which also makes Supreme Court rulings less likely to turn out to be
broad pronouncements. We explore this point and its implications below.
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continued unabated.27 Some people object that the doctrine has unfortunate systemic
effects on agency decisions.28 Others believe that the hard look is simply too hard and
that a soft look would be much better.29 Still others fear that judicial biases play a large
role in the operation of the hard look doctrine—that in finding inadequate explanations or
unreasonableness on the merits, the policy preferences of judges are playing a substantial
role.30 It is perhaps revealing here that State Farm itself, involving a high-profile
initiative by the Reagan Administration, produced, on some key issues, what seemed to
be a political division within the Court on the arbitrariness question, with conservative
justices siding with the Reagan Administration.31 And other observers, most prominently
Justice Breyer, object that there is an evident incongruity in the fact that under existing
doctrine, courts often defer to agency interpretations of law, while taking a hard look at
agency judgments about policy and fact.32
To date, only a sparse empirical literature exists on the actual operation of the
hard look doctrine.33 There is no systematic evidence on the rate of invalidation under
hard look review; we do not know if the rate is 10 percent, or 20 percent, or 40 percent.
Nor is there evidence on the role, if any, of judicial policy preferences. Do Republican
and Democratic appointees vote differently in cases involving hard look review? Are
majority Republican panels different from majority Democratic panels, and if so, how
different are they?
Our aim here is to begin to fill this gap. We do so through an analysis of a large
data set, consisting of all published appellate rulings from 1996 to 2006 involving review
of decisions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and review of National
27

Though the central issues involved statutory interpretation rather than arbitrariness, the Court’s decision
in Mass. v. EPA, 549 US, (2007), might well be taken as a modern version of State Farm, also involving a
“hard look.” For a valuable discussion to this effect, see Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule,
Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, Supreme Court Review (forthcoming).
28
See, e.g., Mashaw and Harfst, supra note (contending that hard look review leads agencies to avoid
rulemaking).
29
See Richard Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin L Rev 59 (1995).
30
See R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (1983).
31
Compare 463 US at (invalidating, as arbitrary, agency decision with respect to detachable and
nondetachable belts) with id at (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
decision on these points was not arbitrary).
32
See Breyer, supra note.
33
The principal exceptions are Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit,
83 Va L Rev 1717 (1997), Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from
Administrative Law, 31 J Leg Stud 61 (2002) (presenting evidence that strategic reasons motivate judges’
choice of Chevron and State Farm as the basis for their decisions).
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions either for arbitrariness or for lack of substantial
evidence.34 (For convenience, we use the phrase “arbitrariness review” to capture the
relevant test, which does not seem to differ significantly across the two contexts.35) Use
of this data set has several advantages. First, both the agency and judicial decisions are
fairly easy to code in political terms, and hence it is possible to test competing hypothesis
about the role of judicial ideology.36 Second, EPA and NLRB decisions are extremely
important in their own right, and they also provide a good “snapshot” of the world of
arbitrariness review.37 Third, there is a large data set, in essentially the same period,
involving judicial review of interpretations of law by the EPA and the NLRB.38 An
examination of arbitrariness review permits instructive comparisons.39 Fourth, the EPA is
an executive agency, whose head is an at-will employee of the president, whereas the
NLRB is an independent agency, whose chair and majority are determined by the
incumbent president but whose members may be discharged only for cause (and therefore
have, in practice, a form of tenure). Hence our data set includes two of the most
prominent agencies, one of which has the “executive agency” form and the other of
which has the “independent agency” form.40
The central goal of arbitrariness review is to filter out serious errors of analysis,
not to encode judicial policy preferences, and we are interested above all in testing
whether courts are carrying out that task. Much of the debate in modern administrative
law is about that question,41 which has yet to be tested. If Democratic and Republican
34

On arbitrariness review and the NLRB, see note infra.
See note
36
This task is far more difficult for such agencies as the Federal Communications Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, where political coding can be quite contentious. We have, however,
compiled a data set of all cases citing State Farm, offering some preliminary conclusions about validation
rates; the data are available on request.
37
Of course we cannot exclude the possibility that the patterns we observe are different for other agencies.
38
See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Federal Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Emprical
Analysis of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823 (2006).
39
The data set for Chevron cases extends across a larger time period, but we find consistent results across
time in those cases, and hence the comparison holds.
40
While our focus is on the period 1996-2006, it is entirely imaginable that similar patterns would be found
in similar periods, including those preceding State Farm. We would not be at all surprised, for example, if
in review of NLRB cases between 1956 and 1966, broadly similar patterns might be found. Prior research
on how administrative agencies fare before the Supreme Court reveals that their success rates vary across
substantially across agencies, but that overall agencies’ success rates are generally stable over time. See
note 83, infra. It would be most interesting, however, to examine directly how the patterns we discern
change, if at all, over time.
41
See, e.g., Melnick, supra note; Breyer, supra note.
35
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appointees show significantly different rates of “liberal voting” in cases reviewing
agency decisions for arbitrariness review, there is evident reason for concern. And if allDemocratic panels show dramatically different voting patterns from all-Republican
panels, there is reason to believe that similarly situated litigants are not being treated
similarly, in a way that has serious consequences for regulatory policy and even the rule
of law.
In brief, our principal findings are as follows.
1. Political commitments significantly influence the operation of hard look review in
EPA and NLRB cases. When the agency decision is liberal, the Democratic
validation rate is 71% and the Republican validation rate is 56%. When the
agency decision is conservative, the Democratic validation rate drops to 58% and
the Republican validation rate rises to 72%. For both Republican and Democratic
appointees, then, the likelihood of a vote to validate is significantly affected by
whether the agency’s decision is liberal or conservative.
2. In an important sense, these figures understate the role of ideology in hard-look
review, because panel effects are substantial. Democratic appointees show higher
liberal voting rates (71%) when sitting with two other Democratic appointees.
Republican appointees show lower liberal voting rates (49%) when sitting with
two other Republican appointees. The resulting difference between the two sets of
appointees—22%—has large consequences for the real world of administrative
law.
3. For the EPA and the NLRB cases, taken together, the overall rate of votes to
validate agency decisions challenged as arbitrary is 64%. Notably, the rate of
validation votes is significantly higher for Democratic appointees than for
Republican appointees: 69% for Democratic appointees and 60% for Republican
appointees. Strikingly, the rate of validation is essentially the same in arbitrariness
review as in Chevron cases—a finding that casts doubt on Justice Breyer’s
suggestion that courts might be giving greater scrutiny to agency judgments of
fact than to agency judgments of law.42
In general, we provide significant evidence of a role for judicial ideology in
judicial review of agency decisions for arbitrariness. The goal of the “arbitrary or
capricious” standard is to ensure that judges invalidate agency actions when those actions
reflect serious analytic errors or palpable political pressures, and to prevent these errors
and pressures from being translated into grounds for law.43 Most ambitiously,
arbitrariness review can be seen as a response to the uneasy constitutional position of
agencies wielding broad discretionary power; perhaps such review can reintroduce
42
43

See Breyer, supra note.
See Merrick Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv L Rev 505 (1988).
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surrogate safeguards for the decline of constitutional checks on agency authority. But if
Democratic appointees are especially inclined to find conservative decisions to be
arbitrary, and if Republican appointees are especially likely to find liberal decisions to be
arbitrary, something is seriously amiss.
Notably, the role of political judgments appears to be strikingly similar when
courts are reviewing agency interpretations of law under Chevron and when judges are
addressing questions of fact and policy under arbitrariness review. The numbers are very
close in the two contexts. This finding suggests that at least in the domain of EPA and
NLRB decisions, ideology influences judges’ decisionmaking to the same extent
regardless of the judicial task or the standard of review. Moreover, the degree of
ideological influence seems roughly the same for both tasks and under both standards.
Our findings offer a clear prediction for the future: When a judiciary consisting
mostly of Democratic appointees confronts a conservative executive branch, the rate of
invalidations will be unusually high, and so too when a judiciary consisting mostly of
Republican appointees confronts a liberal executive branch. The conflict between (for
example) a Democratic administration and a Republican-dominated judicial branch
should be expected to produce a large number of invalidations in the most important
domains of regulatory policy. Notably, such invalidations will typically involve complex
questions of law and fact, not readily suited to oversight by the Supreme Court. We will
offer some suggestions about how existing doctrines might change to counteract the
evident risks.
II. Administrative Law Preliminaries
To understand our study, some background is in order. Agency decisions might be
challenged on many possible grounds. Most obviously, their decisions might violate a
governing statute. With respect to such challenges, much of current doctrine is organized
under the framework established by the Court’s Chevron decision.44 That decision
provides a famous two-step test for evaluating agency interpretations of law. The first
question is whether the agency has violated an unambiguous provision of law. If not, the
court proceeds to the second question, which is whether the agency’s interpretation of an
44

Chevron, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 US 837, 842-44 (1984).
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ambiguous provision is reasonable.45 But many agency interpretations are not entitled to
judicial deference under Chevron, and such interpretations will receive less deference, or
even no deference, from reviewing courts.46 We are not concerned with agency
interpretations of law here, except by way of comparison.
Agency decisions might also be challenged as inconsistent with the procedural
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)47 or any other applicable
statute. For example, the agency might have issued a rule without using notice-andcomment procedures,48 or it might have violated a statutory prohibition on ex parte
communications.49 Judicial review of agency compliance with the APA’s procedural
requirements raises many important questions, and an empirical study of the relevant
judicial decisions would undoubtedly be instructive. Perhaps ideological voting can be
found in this domain as well. Might Democratic appointees be comparatively willing to
find violations of the procedural requirements of the APA when the agency has issued a
conservative rule? Might Republican appointees to more willing to invalidate agency
decisions on procedural grounds when those decisions turn out to be liberal? We suspect
so, and it would be valuable to know; but we do not explore such issues here.
Our focus is on the question whether agency decisions are unlawful because
arbitrary or lacking substantial evidence. That question might be understood as a kind of
Step 3, to be asked directly after the two-step inquiry mandated by Chevron. To
understand that question, it is necessary to explore the hard look doctrine and State Farm
in somewhat more detail. The case itself involved an important controversy over the legal
validity of a change in regulatory policy initiated by the Reagan Administration. Under
President Carter, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had
shown considerable interest in “passive restraints,” in the form of automatic seatbelts or
airbags, which would protect drivers even if they failed to take action to buckle up.50 The
ultimate regulation, issued in the closing months of the Carter Administration, required
automobile manufacturers to equip new cars with one of three possible passive restraints:
45

Id. at 843-44.
See US v. Mead Corp, 533 US 218 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev. 187
(2006).
47
5 USC 551 et seq,
48
See, e.g., Community Nutrition Inst. v Young, 818 F2d 943 (DC Cir 1987).
49
See PATCO v. FLRA, 685 F2d 547 (DC Cir 1982).
50
463 US at 35-37.
46
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detachable seatbelts; nondetachable seatbelts; or airbags.51 NHTSA concluded that the
new rule would produce at least a 13% increase in seatbelt usage, and that as a result, its
benefits would justify its costs.52
Within six months, President Reagan’s NHTSA repealed the regulation.53 In brief,
the agency concluded that contrary to the analysis under President Carter, the regulation
would not produce a significant increase in seatbelt usage, and hence the benefits were
too uncertain to justify the imposition of the passive restraints rule on manufacturers.54
This conclusion was challenged as arbitrary; the challengers invoked the hard look
doctrine. The government responded quite ambitiously, by attacking that doctrine as
illegitimate; in its view, agency action must be upheld unless it was wholly irrational, in a
highly deferential analysis similar to that undertaken under the due process clause.55
Notwithstanding its ambition, this argument did not seem implausible in light of the
Court’s then-recent decision in Vermont Yankee,56 which emphasized that judges had no
business burdening agencies with duties that could not be found in the Administrative
Procedure Act or some other source of law.57 Moreover, the government’s objection to
the hard look doctrine could draw strength from the view, pressed by many skeptics in
the period, that liberal judges had used the doctrine so as to push regulatory policies in
the directions that they themselves favored on the merits.58
In striking down the repeal of the regulation, the Court endorsed both procedural
and substantive aspects of the hard look doctrine.59 Speaking in general terms, the Court
unanimously said that the agency must provide a detailed explanation of agency action,
offer careful attention to counterarguments, and show serious engagement with
alternatives.60 On the merits, the Court concluded, again by a unanimous vote, that the
repeal of the regulation was arbitrary because NHTSA had not investigated whether an

51

Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 51-55.
53
Id at 38-40.
54
Id. at 54-55.
55
See id at 44 n. 9.
56
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 US 519 (1978).
57
Id. at 550-551.
58
See, e.g., R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts (1983).
59
463 US at 47-50.
60
Id. at 48-51.
52

10

“airbags only” alternative would have produced sufficient benefits to justify the rule.61
By a vote of 5–4, the Court also held that the agency’s analysis of detachable and
nondetachable belts was arbitrary, because it depended on unsupported judgments about
likely facts.62
The 5–4 division within the Court is especially noteworthy for our purposes, for it
occurred along evidently political lines. The dissenting opinion was written by thenJustice Rehnquist, who emphasized that it was entirely appropriate for President Reagan
to reject the policies of his predecessor.63 In his words, “[t]he agency’s changed view of
the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a different political
party. . . . A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits
of its programs and regulations.”64 Thus Justice Rehnquist offered a firm plea for judicial
deference in the face of the new commitments of a new administration—a plea that bears
directly on the data that we shall offer here.
State Farm was widely taken to have ratified the hard look doctrine.65 The Court’s
description of the appropriate standard of review, and its conclusions on the merits,
suggested that courts should require detailed justifications for an agency action and also
examine the reasonableness of the agency’s conclusions. There was obvious tension,
however, between State Farm and Chevron, decided just one year later.66 Under State
Farm, courts would take a hard look at agency judgments of policy and fact; under
Chevron, courts would give considerable deference to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. Hence it was natural to object, as did then-Judge Breyer, that a
sensible system of judicial review would not entitle courts to give careful scrutiny to
judgments of policy and fact while also requiring them to defer on questions of law.67 If
we attend to the distinctive competence of agencies and courts, the opposite conclusion
might seem hard to resist: Questions of law are for judicial resolution, whereas questions
of policy and fact should be resolved by agencies.
61

Id at 48-49.
Id. at 51-55.
63
Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64
Id.
65
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note.
66
See Breyer, supra note.
67
See id.
62
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But this simple comparison between State Farm and Chevron misses some
complexities. First, it may not be correct to suggest that the former decision suggests
“less” deference than the former. Under Chevron, agencies must obey unambiguous
statutes,68 and even when there is ambiguity, agency interpretations must be reasonable.69
Under State Farm, agency decisions will also be upheld so long as they are reasonable.70
In the abstract, it would be possible to read the two rulings in a way that would not create
the anomaly to which Justice Breyer objects. In any case it is much too simple to suggest
that courts should decide questions of law on their own.71 Where statutes are ambiguous,
the resolution of the ambiguity frequently requires judgments of policy and principle.
Chevron rests on the belief that such judgments should be made by officials with a degree
of accountability and specialized competence, not by judges.72
But if this point is correct, State Farm itself must be taken with a degree of
caution. Review of agency decisions for arbitrariness often involves highly technical
issues of policy and fact, and rulings by courts of appeals are usually too particularistic to
be well-suited to Supreme Court review. If State Farm is operating in a way that reflects
judicial policy preferences, Justice Breyer’s objection has considerable force.
The empirical questions emerge as the important ones. What, exactly, have
appellate courts73 been doing? What might be said about the real world of arbitrariness
review? It is to these questions that we now turn.
III. Arbitrariness Review of EPA and NLRB Decisions in the Courts of Appeals
A. Data and Method
We devote our attention to two agencies whose decisions have a high degree of
practical importance and political salience, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

68

See, e.g., Public Citizen v Young, 831 F2d 1108 (DC Cir 1997).
See, e.g., Ohio v. Dept of Interior, 880 F2d 432 (DC Cir 1989).
70
See, e.g., Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F2d 654 (DC Cir 1989).
71
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke LJ 511; E.
Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters, 16 Vill Env LJ 1 (2005).
72
See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale LJ
2580 (2006).
73
We put decisions by the Supreme Court to one side, on the ground that the Court has decided very few
cases involving “arbitrary or capricious” review, and hence no results would have statistical power.
69
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and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).74 We extracted from the standard legal
databases a list of appellate court cases that applied arbitrary and capricious or substantial
evidence review to decisions of the EPA and NLRB75 between 1996 and 2006. There
were 653 cases in all, and a strong majority of these cases, 607, reviewed NLRB
decisions. It would be natural to think that in view of these numbers, our focus is
necessarily on review of NLRB decisions, but most of the patterns do not significantly
differ as between review of EPA decisions and review of NLRB decisions. Where the
differences are significant, we report them. (Our strong suspicion is that the same general
patterns would be found for other agencies, but that point must remain speculative for
now.) We coded the votes of the individual judges in these cases and assembled a file of
judge-by-case observations. Of the 1,959 total votes by judges in these cases, 861 were
votes by appointees of Democratic presidents and 1,098 were votes of appointees of
Republican presidents.
For all of the key questions, illuminating patterns emerge, allowing us to assess
party and panel effects in arbitrariness review. We are also able to disaggregate the data
in such a way as to cast light on questions that have been explored in the literature on
both arbitrariness review and judicial behavior under Chevron.76
To test the role of judicial policy judgments, we use several interacting measures.
For judges, we focus on the party of the appointing president, because that factor has
importance in its own right and because it serves as a rough proxy for the ideological
preferences of the judges. To say the least, it would be valuable to know if Democratic
appointees are especially likely to find arbitrariness on the part of Republican
administrations, or if the validation rates of Republican appointees increase when the
president is a Republican. Although political scientists have legitimately criticized the use
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of party as a proxy for political ideology77 and often use “common space scores” as an
alternate measure,78 the political party of the appointing president remains a valuable tool
of inquiry,79 especially for those interested in the power of the executive to move the
federal judiciary in its preferred directions.
We measure the political content of the agency decisions in two distinct ways.
First, we classify agency differences as “conservative” or “liberal” on the basis of the
identity of the party making the challenge. When a labor union or public interest group
challenges an agency decision, we deem it to be relevantly “conservative.” When an
industry group or corporation challenges the agency’s decision, we code it as relevantly
“liberal.” The reason for this approach is that the reviewing court assesses the position of
an agency not in the abstract, but in relation to the claims of the particular challenger.
When a public interest group, such as the Sierra Club or the Natural Resources Defense
Council, brings a challenge, the agency appears conservative relative to the challenger.
When a corporation challenges an agency decision that regulates water pollution or finds
an unfair labor practice, the agency appears liberal relative to the challenger. This coding
scheme does introduce some imprecision, which we attempted to correct by investigating
individual cases; but as compared to the alternative of ad hoc evaluation of each agency
policy, its objectivity and its easy administrability are its virtues. It is important not to be
confused by the measure: A Republican administration might issue many decisions that
are relevantly liberal, in the sense that companies find it worthwhile to challenge them,
and observers might nonetheless conclude that those decisions are conservative by some
objective measure.
Our second proxy for the political direction of the agency decision is whether the
case was decided during a Democratic or Republican administration. As a general rule,
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the positions of agencies under Democratic presidencies are certainly more liberal (or less
conservative) than those of agencies under Republican presidencies. To the extent that
this generalization is crude, it remains independently important to understand how
judicial behavior changes across administrations. A potential difficulty with this measure
is that litigation may take years to resolve, and courts of appeals might well be asked to
evaluate a regulation, initially issued under the Clinton Administration, during the Bush
Administration. When litigation extends across administrations of opposing parties,
misattributions may occur. But it is not entirely clear that the relevant question is the
political affiliation of the administration that initially issued a regulation or a final order;
perhaps what matters is the affiliation of the administration that is litigating the case.
Note that a new administration has the opportunity to reverse agency positions and settle
ongoing cases before the court issues its decision.80 In any event, our findings are not
significantly affected if we adjust the data to consider the administration that originally
issued the regulation or order.
B.

Judicial Votes and Partisan Affiliations

1. Validation rates. Table 1 reports the rates at which circuit judges vote to
validate the decisions of the EPA and NLRB under the arbitrary and capricious and
substantial evidence standards.81 Column (1) shows total validation rates for Democratic
and Republican appointees. It reveals that overall, Democratic appointees vote with
significantly higher frequency to validate decisions of the EPA and NLRB. The overall
validation rate under arbitrariness review is quite close to the average validation rate
under Chevron of 64%.82 But a difference between arbitrariness review and Chevron is
immediately apparent. In the Chevron cases, the overall validation rates of Democratic
and Republican appointees are the same, while under arbitrariness review the validation
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rate of Democratic appointees is nine percentage points higher than that of Republican
appointees.
What accounts for this difference? The answer lies in the higher proportion of
liberal agency decisions among the arbitrariness cases, which makes ideological
differences immediately detectable. Decisions by the NLRB comprise a far larger share
of our data set here, and a larger share of these decisions are liberal by our standards.
(Recall that those standards are relative, not absolute; an employer might challenge an
NLRB decision that has a Republican majority, even though the decision is far more
conservative than what would emerge from an NLRB with a Democratic majority.)
NLRB decisions account for 92% of the arbitrariness cases but only 25% of the Chevron
cases. In addition, over 94% of the NRLB decisions reviewed for arbitrariness were
liberal,83 while 67% of those reviewed under Chevron were coded as liberal. In contrast,
EPA decisions, both under Chevron and arbitrariness review, were roughly evenly split
between liberal and conservative decisions. Because a disproportionate share of the
agency decisions subjected to arbitrariness review were liberal, ideological differences
are immediately apparent in arbitrariness data.
Although we do not have a definitive explanation for the differences in the
number and nature of the two agencies’ decisions, we believe that the underlying reason
is straightforward.84 The EPA makes essentially all of its policies via rulemaking, and the
number of rules in any particular year is relatively small. Because they are conducted
against the background of clear regulations, EPA adjudications frequently involve the
application of settled law to not-much-disputed fact, and the room for challenge in court
83
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is not large. By contrast, the NLRB makes essentially all of its policies via adjudication,
and the number of adjudications in any particular year is large. Moreover, there is
considerable room for challenging the NLRB’s judgments about policy and fact. The
making of national labor policy through case-by-case decisionmaking has attracted
considerable skeptical attention in the Supreme Court itself.85 The large number of NLRB
cases in our sample reflects the fact that the NLRB makes many more decisions that are
subject to a plausible challenge on arbitrariness or substantial evidence grounds. By
contrast, a high percentage of EPA decisions can be challenged on Chevron grounds, and
a high percentage of NLRB decisions cannot be; hence the proportions in Chevron cases
are less lopsided.
This sizable gap in the ideological direction of the agency decisions generates a
difference in the validation rates across the two agencies. Figure 1 shows the rates at
which judges of both parties voted to validate the decisions of the two agencies. The EPA
enjoyed a higher rate of validation when its decisions faced challenges for arbitrariness.
Overall, judges voted to validate EPA decisions 72% of the time compared to only 62%
for the NLRB.86 The EPA’s decisions also produced a more modest (but still significant)
partisan gap in the judges’ voting. The rate at which Democratic and Republican
appointees voted to reject arbitrariness challenges to EPA decisions differed by fewer
than five percentage points. The gap for NLRB decisions was more than twice as large.
Democratic appointees voted to validate NLRB decisions 69% of the time while
Republican appointees did so only 58% of the time.
The differences across agencies have many similarities as well as some contrasts
with our earlier findings with respect to Chevron review.87 The primary contrast is that
under Chevron, the NLRB enjoyed a slightly higher validation rate than the EPA, while
under arbitrariness review, this ordering is reversed. The primary common feature is that
under both arbitrariness review and Chevron, the partisan gap in validation rates is largest
for NLRB decisions. Evidently the labor-management relations that come to the federal
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courts of appeals are more ideologically contentious than are the environmental issues,
which might well appear more technical. Perhaps, too, courts are more reluctant to
invalidate rules than to invalidate the outcomes of particular adjudications.
When we decompose the data by examining the ideological content of the agency
decision, we find even more substantial differences in the behavior of the two groups of
appointees.
2. Political voting and failed aspirations. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 stratify
the voting rates by the partisan policy direction of the agency decision, and we now see
an especially sharp contrast in the voting patterns of Republican and Democratic
appointees. We are able to demonstrate for the first time88 that judicial policy judgments
play an unquestionable role under arbitrariness review.
(a) Liberal agencies, conservative agencies. When the agency decision is
conservative, Democratic appointees vote to conclude that the agency was arbitrary and
capricious at a rate that is 16 percentage points lower than when the agency decision is
liberal. The pattern is in the opposite direction for Republican appointees. When the
agency decision is liberal, Republican appointees vote to validate at a rate that is 14
percentage points lower than when it is conservative. These patterns imply that the
validation rates of Democratic appointees are nearly 13 percentage points above that of
their Republican counterparts for liberal agency decisions and almost 17 percentage
points below that of the Republicans for conservative agency decisions—to say the least,
a dramatic difference in the operation of hard-look review.
These findings contain striking similarities to our previous analysis of judicial
review under Chevron. The frequency of agency validation is nearly identical under the
arbitrary and capricious review as it is under Chevron; both are about 64%.89 This finding
bears on the concern Justice Breyer voiced two decades ago, to the effect that under
existing doctrine, agencies might be significantly more likely to lose on issues of fact and
policies than on issues of law.90 Our data do not confirm this prediction. Rather, the data
appear consistent with now-standard analyses of litigant decisionmaking. Recall that
88
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litigants should be expected to adjust their behavior to the prevailing standard of
review,91 and the roughly similar validation rates under arbitrariness review and Chevron
suggest that litigants readily make these adjustments. Because litigants are likely to adjust
their decision in accordance with the intensity of review, our figures cannot be taken to
answer the question whether Chevron review is more rigorous that arbitrariness review,
or vice-versa. A constant rate of 64% is possible even if one standard is far more
searching than another, if we assume, as seems likely, that the selection of cases will be
affected by litigant perceptions of when they are least likely to lose.
Both Chevron and State Farm seek to cabin the influence of judicial ideology in
the review of agency decision making. An evident aspiration of the Chevron approach is
to limit the role of judicial judgments in the domain of policy.92 Despite its command of
deference to reasonable agency interpretations of law, the persistence of judicial politics
under Chevron is plain.93 State Farm does call for judicial scrutiny of agency judgments
about fact and policy, but the Court made clear that so long as the agency offered “a
reasoned analysis,” it would be permitted to do as it saw fit.94 Indeed, State Farm must be
taken in the context of both Overton Park, where the Court emphasized that “the ultimate
standard of review is a narrow one” affording the agency “a presumption of regularity,”95
and Vermont Yankee, where the Court stressed that the ultimate decision is for agencies,
not for courts.96 The Court has yet to offer an unambiguous warning about the
politicization of judicial review under scrutiny of possible “arbitrariness,” but the key
decisions are plainly meant to reduce the relevant risks.
Notwithstanding the Court’s aspirations, the figures in Table 1 show a large role
for judicial policy preferences in arbitrariness review. The magnitude of the fluctuation in
validation rates between liberal and conservative agency decisions is roughly the same in
arbitrariness review cases as it is in Chevron cases. Under both standards, the validation
rates of Democratic and Republican appointees see-saw in response to the ideological
content of the agency decision. When the agency decision is liberal, Democratic
91
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appointees validate more often by about 14 percentage points, and when the agency
decision is conservative, Republican appointees validate more often by about 17
percentage points. The results demonstrate that arbitrariness review under the State Farm
framework has failed to eliminate the influence of judicial ideology in review of agency
decisions of policy and fact.97
(b) Republican administrations, Democratic administrations. Table 2
presents validation rates for the two groups of judges when the party of the current
president is used as the measure of the political valence of the agency decision. We
anticipated that Republican appointees would be more likely to uphold decisions under
Republican administrations and that Democratic appointees would be more likely to
uphold decisions under Democratic administrations—and indeed this is the pattern we
observe in the Chevron context.98 We were initially surprised to find that the validation
rates do not correlate strongly with the party of the current president. During a
Democratic administration, Democratic appointees vote to validate EPA and NLRB
decisions 68% of the time, a rate two percentage points lower than their validation rate
during Republican administrations. Directly contrary to what one might anticipate, the
validation rates of Republican appointees are actually about 7 percentage points higher
during Democratic administrations, though this difference is not statistically significant.
These patterns show that when reviewing EPA and NLRB decisions for
arbitrariness, the validation rates of Democratic appointees are higher than those of
Republican appointees, irrespective of which party currently holds the presidency. During
Democratic presidencies, the validation rates of Democratic appointees in these cases
were 12 percentage points higher than that of Republican appointees, and during
Republican presidencies, this difference was only 6.5 percentage points. But the gap
between these figures (12 versus 6.5) is not statistically meaningful. What is clear is that
Democratic appointees validate EPA and NLRB decisions at higher rates during both the
Democratic and Republican administrations during this period.
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At first blush, Tables 1 and 2 present a confusing and inconsistent picture of
whether judges are responsive to the ideological content of the agency decision. In Table
1, the validation rates of appointees from both parties appear highly responsive to
political considerations, while in Table 2 the validation rates of Democratic appointees
appear consistently higher than those of Republican appointees. How can these patterns
be explained?
The answer lies in the fact that Republican administrations often produce a rule,
decision, or order that is relevantly liberal, in the sense that it is challenged by a company
that is regulated by an EPA rule or displeased by a finding of an unfair labor practice by
the NLRB. So too, a Democratic administration may and often does produce a decision or
rule that is relevantly conservative, in the sense that it is challenged by a public interest
group or a labor union. It is for this reason that in these data the purely political coding of
the agency’s decision is a more accurate measure than the party of the administration at
the time the court issues its ruling. As previously described, the arbitrariness cases in the
data are disproportionately liberal decisions by the NRLB.99
For that reason, it should not be puzzling that in Table 2, the validation rates of
Democratic appointees appear higher than those of Republican appointees in both
Republican and Democratic administrations. What matters is whether the agency’s
decision was liberal, not whether it was issued under a Republican president. It follows
that if the goal is to assess the role of judicial ideology in arbitrariness review, there is
reason for much greater confidence in the estimates based on our direct coding of the
agency decisions.
With these qualifications in mind, the central findings are clear. In cases applying
arbitrariness review, the validation rates of Democratic appointees exceed those of
Republican appointees by at least 6 percentage points. When individual agency decisions
are classified according to their ideological content, the role of politics is unmistakable:
Democratic appointees are far more likely to uphold liberal decisions than conservative
99
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ones, and Republican appointees show the opposite pattern. Arbitrariness review is being
applied in a way that shows a large influence from judicial policy preferences.
C.

Panel Effects

1. The standard patterns. A great deal of evidence shows that the composition of
appellate panels significantly influences the voting behavior of individual judges. In
many domains, the standard pattern includes ideological dampening and ideological
amplification.100 Dampening occurs when Democratic appointees show unusually
conservative voting patterns when sitting with two Republican appointees, and when
Republican appointees show unusually liberal voting patterns when sitting with two
Democratic appointees. Amplification occurs when the most liberal voting patterns, by
individual judges, are found for Democratic appointees on panels consisting of only
Democratic appointees, and when the most conservative patterns, by individual judges,
are found for Republican appointees on all-Republican panels.101
2. The standard patterns here. Democratic appointees typically show increasingly
liberal voting patterns as the number of Democratic appointees increases, and Republican
appointees typically show increasingly conservative voting patterns as the number of
Republican appointees increases.102 As we shall soon see, our most striking finding here
is a form of ideological amplification, clearly demonstrated once agency and judicial
decisions are coded in political terms. In arbitrariness cases, Democratic appointees show
heightened liberal voting on DDD panels, just as Republican appointees show heightened
conservative voting on RRR panels.
Figure 2 examines whether panel effects are present in the context of validation
rates. The rates of Democratic appointees appear in the darkly shaded bars, and those of
Republican appointees appear in lightly shaded bars. Notably, the figure shows that
overall the validation rates of Democratic appointees are unresponsive to the partisan
composition of a panel. When sitting with two other Democrats, the average Democratic
appointee votes to validate 72% of the time. This rate falls by only two percentage points
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when the panel has one Republican and by only three percentage points when it has two
Republican appointees.
In contrast, Republican appointees demonstrate some responsiveness to panel
composition. True, the validation rate of the average Republican appointee falls by only
three percentage points when she sits with one Democratic appointee and one Republican
appointee, rather than two Democratic appointees. But when a panel consists of two other
Republicans rather than a Democrat and another Republican, her average validation rate
falls by six percentage points. This is a modest but unmistakable form of ideological
amplification.103
As Table 1 revealed, overall validation rates obscure pronounced ideological
patterns. Table 3 therefore decomposes the validation rates of Democratic and
Republican appointees by both panel composition and the ideological content of the
agency decision.104 It compares the validation rates for judges of each party according to
whether the panel was politically “mixed” and whether the agency decision was liberal.
Column (1) of Table 3 shows the overall validation rates, and these figures are
comparable to those in Figure 2. But this grouping of the data emphasizes that validation
rates in these arbitrariness review cases steadily decline as the number of Republican
appointees on a panel grow, and that the validation rates of Democratic and Republican
appointees sitting on politically mixed panels are fairly close; they differ by only 6.5
percentage points.
The remaining columns of Table 3 display the relationship of validation rates to
the nature of the agency decisions. Two patterns are immediately evident. First,
politically unanimous panels exhibit strong ideological responses to the content of the
agency decisions. The average validation rate of a panel consisting of three Democratic
appointees is 23 percentage points higher when the agency decision is liberal rather than
conservative! For panels consisting of three Republicans, the response is even stronger
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but in the opposite direction. The average validation rate of all-Republican panels in these
arbitrariness review cases is 28 percentage points lower when the agency decision is
liberal rather than conservative.
These patterns imply that when the agency decision is liberal, the validation rate
of a Democratic appointee sitting on a panel with two other Democrats is 23 percentage
points higher than that of a Republican sitting with two other Republicans. When the
agency decision is instead conservative, the direction of this gap reverses but its
magnitude remains very large. The validation rate of a Democratic appointee sitting with
two other Democratic appointees is 28 percentage points below that of a Republican
appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees. Here, then, is a clear “smoking
gun” with respect to panel effects.
These figures reveal that the see-sawing of the validation rates of Democratic and
Republican appointees in response to the nature of agency decisions shown in Table 1 is
attributable to a large degree to the behavior of judges on politically uniform panels. A
comparison of rows (A) and (D) in Table 4 shows a pattern of see-sawing validation rates
akin to that in Table 1—only more pronounced. The validation rates of Democratic
appointees sitting with two other Democrats are almost the mirror image of those of
Republican appointees sitting with two other Republicans.
For judges sitting on politically mixed panels, the movement of validation rates in
response to the ideological content of the agency decision is muted but not entirely
absent. A Democratic appointee on a politically mixed panel has an average validation
rate 13 percentage points higher when the agency decision is liberal rather than
conservative, and this movement is statistically significant. A Republican appointee on a
politically mixed panel votes to validate under arbitrariness review 8 percentage points
less often when the agency decision is liberal rather than conservative, but this difference
is not statistically significant.
These patterns also mean that when the agency decision is liberal, Democratic
appointees on politically mixed panels vote to validate about 9 percentage points more
often than Republican appointees on politically mixed panels. The opposite happens
when the agency decision is conservative; the average Democratic appointee on a
politically mixed panel votes in favor of validation 12 percentage points less often than
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the average Republican appointee on a politically mixed panel. Even on politically mixed
panels, Democratic and Republican appointees react to the ideological content of agency
decisions in the predicted directions, and their responses are large enough to generate a
see-saw pattern in validation rates, albeit a pattern less pronounced than on politically
uniform panels.
3. Comparing Chevron. As striking as these ideological patterns are, the role of
judicial partisanship under Chevron was just as distinct, if not more so.105 In terms of raw
numbers, the effect is even more dramatic. The rate at which Democratic appointees
sitting with two other Democrats voted to validate liberal agency interpretations of
statutes was 32 percentage points higher than their validation rate for conservative agency
interpretations. For Republican appointees sitting with two other Republican appointees,
the validation rate was more than 40% higher when the agency interpretation was
conservative rather than liberal. Hence it is plausible but false to speculate that Chevron
has imposed a greater discipline on political voting than can be found in the domain or
arbitrariness review. In our data, at least, the speculation is rejected.
When politically mixed panels reviewed agency interpretations under Chevron,
the movement in validation rates of Republican appointees was not statistically
significant, while for Democratic appointees, it was an increase of 20 percentage points,
which was statistically significant. Interestingly, in arbitrariness review cases,
Democratic appointees on mixed panels also show a statistically significant response to
the nature of the agency decision while Republican appointees on mixed panels do not.
More importantly, the sample sizes preclude any strong inferences about whether the
response of politically unanimous panels to the nature of the agency decisions is larger
under Chevron than under arbitrariness review. Nevertheless, the results in Table 3
indicate that when the ideological content of the agency decision is considered, the
partisan composition of panels exerts a substantial influence on judges’ exercise of
arbitrariness review.
4. Conclusions. The discussion of panel effects has been regrettably complex, but
the major conclusions are plain. In arbitrariness review cases, judicial votes are
significantly affected by the composition of the panel. The political party of the
105
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appointing president is a good predictor of judicial behavior in such cases, and the
political party of the president who appointed the other two judges on the panel is also a
strong predictor. A key finding is that the more Democratic appointees on a panel, the
greater the likelihood of validation. But perhaps our most striking finding here involves
the reaction of judges on politically uniform panels to the nature of the agency decisions.
The willingness of these judges to validate an agency’s decision under the arbitrariness
standard correlates strongly with the ideological direction of the agency decision. On
RRR and DDD panels, judges are at least 20 percentage points more likely to reject an
arbitrariness challenge when the agency decision agrees with their presumed ideological
preference than when it disagrees. This finding suggests that the influences of judicial
ideology and panel composition exert approximately the same power in arbitrariness
review as they do in review under Chevron.
D. Liberal Voting, Conservative Voting
1. Liberal voting rates. Another way to analyze the votes of the judges to examine
whether their votes can be considered “liberal.” We classified a judge’s vote as liberal if
it was a vote either to validate a liberal agency decision or to invalidate a conservative
agency decision. Table 4 presents comparisons of the liberal voting rates of Democratic
and Republican appointees. Column (1) of Table 4 shows the overall liberal voting rates
of Democratic and Republican appointees, and consistent with conventional wisdom,
Democratic appointees cast liberal votes far more frequently. Democratic appointees vote
in a liberal way 68% of the time, which is about 12 percentage points higher than the
percentage for Republican appointees. It is worth underlining here that we are concerned
with judicial decisions striking down agency judgments of fact or policy as arbitrary or
unreasonable, where the convictions of federal judges are not supposed to play a role; but
in that domain, a 12 percentage point difference shows a significant effect from judicial
preferences.
This pattern is comparable to the liberal voting rates that prevail in cases
reviewing EPA and NLRB decisions under Chevron. When the statutory interpretations
of these agencies faced challenges, Democratic appointees voted in a liberal way 67% of
the time, and Republican appointees 50% of the time. The slightly lower rate of liberal
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voting by Republican appointees in Chevron cases is not statistically distinguishable from
their rate of liberal voting in arbitrariness cases. The partisan gap in liberal voting in
cases reviewing the agency decisions for arbitrariness is effectively identical to gap
present in cases applying the two steps of Chevron.
The next two columns of Table 4 break out the liberal voting rates according to
the party of the current president. As seen previously, the party of the current president is
an imprecise measure of the ideological content of the agency decisions in these
arbitrariness cases. The final column of Table 4 shows that the liberal voting rates of both
Democratic and Republican appointees rise by about 6 percentage points when the party
of the current president changes. For Democratic appointees, the direction of this
movement is contrary to the standard prediction, which is that a judge votes more
consistently with her presumed ideology when the current president belongs to her own
political party. The finding that Democratic appointees vote in a liberal fashion during the
Republican presidency is consistent with our earlier claim that many of the NLRB
decisions during our observation period are relevantly liberal.
2. Panel effects. Figure 3 presents liberal voting rates of the circuit judges by their
political party and by the partisan composition of the panel. The liberal voting rates of
Republican appointees are everywhere below those of Democratic appointees, but they
are highest when the panel has a DDR configuration. In that setting, Republican
appointees cast liberal votes 64% of the time, which is 8 percentage points higher than
when the panel has two Republicans and one Democrat. Moreover, Republican
appointees cast liberal votes most infrequently when the panel consists of three
Republicans. Both ideological dampening and amplification thus characterize the liberal
voting rates of Republican appointees.
In contrast, Democratic appointees show much less fluctuation in their liberal
voting rates. When a panel consists of three Democrat appointees, they cast liberal votes
71% of the time, a rate that is only two percentage points higher than when the panel has
two Democrats and one Republican. Their liberal voting rates slip to 64% when the
Democratic appointee sits with two Republicans. For these Democratic appointees,
ideological dampening is a feature of their liberal voting in arbitrariness cases while
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ideological amplification is not.106 A consequence of these patterns is that the liberal
voting rates of Republican appointees fluctuate with the composition of the panel about
twice as much as those of Democratic appointees (i.e., a movement of 15 percentage
points for Republicans versus 7 for Democrats).
These results are generally consistent with our findings for Chevron, but some
subtle differences are also present.107 Under both standards of review, Democratic
appointees cast liberal votes more often than Republicans irrespective of the panel
composition, and the liberal voting rates of judges of both parties fluctuated to some
degree with panel composition. But in the Chevron cases, the liberal voting rates of
Democratic appointees, rather than Republicans, appear more responsive to panel
composition. The liberal voting rates of Democratic appointees in Chevron cases climb
steadily as the number of Democrats on a panel grew. The liberal voting rates of
Republican appointees under Chevron were steady as long as Republicans formed a
majority of judges on the panel, and they dipped when a Republican sat with two
Democrats. While these patterns invite interpretations about the differences between the
two standards of review, the noisiness of estimates prevents us from drawing strong
inferences.
IV.

The Distinctiveness of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
In view of its importance and its specialized docket, which consists in large part

of regulatory problems, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is the appellate
court most frequently studied by administrative law scholars and political scientists.108
Precisely because of its distinctive role, a natural question is whether the voting behavior
of D.C. Circuit judges is representative. To what degree does the unique nature of the
D.C. Circuit lead it to perform in distinctive ways? This section provides some answers.
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We do not have an explanation for this intriguing finding. Generally, ideological amplification and
ideological dampening move hand-in-hand. In some cases, neither is present, apparently because judges
have strong convictions and are not much influenced by the views of their colleagues; the cases of abortion
and capital punishment are the key examples here. See Sunstein et al., supra note. Why dampening would
occur, but amplification would not, is not simple to explain. Perhaps Democratic appointees, in the relevant
cases, are willing to offer collegial concurrences (hence dampening) but vote their convictions so long as
they are in the majority (hence Democratic appointees show the same patterns on DDR and DDD panels).
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Our most important findings are that the validation rate on the D.C. Circuit is
significantly lower than the validation rate elsewhere, and that the court as a whole shows
conservative voting patterns—so much so that Democratic appointees, on the D.C.
Circuit, show voting patterns akin to that of Republican appointees elsewhere.
A. Three Initial Findings
Table 5 reports the rates at which Democratic and Republican appointees to the
D.C. and other circuits vote to validate decisions of the EPA and NLRB. Three aspects of
these validation rates are immediately apparent. First, despite its specialized docket, the
D.C. Circuit accounts for only 187 of the 653 cases, or somewhat less than a third of the
total. This is a significantly lower share than in judicial applications of Chevron. Of the
227 challenges to the EPA and NLRB under Chevron over the same time period, the D.C.
Circuit decided 109 of them, or 48%.
Second, the final row of Table 5 shows that in both the D.C. Circuit and other
circuits, the overall validation rates of Democratic appointees are higher than those of
Republican appointees. In the D.C. Circuit, Democratic appointees vote to validate at a
rate about 8 percentage points higher than their Republican colleagues, while in other
circuits, they do so at a rate about 11 percentage points higher. The pervasiveness of this
partisan gap is meaningful, but the inter-circuit difference of 3 percentage points (i.e., 8
versus 11) is not. Democratic appointees both within and outside of the D.C. Circuit
voted to validate agency decisions significantly more often than Republican appointees.
The third finding is the most interesting. The final column of Table 5 shows that
both Democratic and Republican appointees to the D.C. Circuit are much less willing to
validate the decisions of the EPA and NLRB in arbitrariness cases than are judges in
other circuits. The Democratic appointees to the D.C. Circuit were 7 percentage points
less likely to validate than their counterparts in other circuits, while for Republicans the
difference was slightly larger, 10 percentage points. This contrast is striking both for its
size and for its consistency across partisan affiliations.
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B. Of Familiarity and Contempt
A promising explanation of these differences is the greater experience of D.C.
Circuit judges in reviewing administrative agencies. With the exception of a very few
judges whose tenure on the bench only briefly overlapped with our sample period, every
D.C. Circuit judge in this period appears at least two dozen times in our data.109 The
median number of votes in our data from such D.C. Circuit judges is 53 and the mean is
52.2. Outside of the D.C. Circuit, judges hear arbitrariness challenges to EPA and NLRB
decisions far less frequently. The median number of judges deciding cases involving the
EPA and NLRB is two and the mean is 4.1.110 If we were to calculate the median number
of relevant EPA and NLRB cases heard by the typical appellate judge outside the D.C.
Circuit, it would likely be zero, because many judges never sit on cases requiring
arbitrariness review and thus never appear in our data.
Judges who are experienced in conducting arbitrariness review might well
become harder reviewers. With greater experience, judges may grow more confident in
their own judgments about what is arbitrary and thus may be more willing to invalidate
agency decisions. In addition to having greater experience with hard look review
generally, judges may be more willing to invalidate if they have previously reviewed the
decisions of a specific agency. Familiarity may not necessarily breed contempt, but
repeated play may allow judges to learn where particular agencies are prone to
weaknesses in their procedures or their analyses. It is reasonable to speculate that the
higher invalidation rates in the D.C. Circuit, for both Democratic and Republican
appointees, is at least partly explained in these terms.
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Judges who left the D.C. Circuit relatively early in our observation period are Judges James Buckley,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Patricia Wald, and those who joined it relatively late are Judges Janice Rogers
Brown and Thomas Griffith. Then-Judge John Roberts is both a late arrival and an early departure in our
data. The mean number of votes from each of these judges is 8.1 and the median is 6.
110
Another example of this difference is the gap between the judges in our sample who have decided the
most hard look reviews of the EPA and NLRB. The D.C. Circuit judge in our data who voted in the most
arbitrariness review cases, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, heard 66 of them. Outside of the D.C. Circuit,
the judge in our data who sat on the most hard look cases, Judge Joel Flaum in the 7th Circuit, heard 25 of
them. Close behind Judge Flaum are his 7th Circuit colleagues Judges Diane Wood and Ilana Rovner, each
with 24 decisions in these cases.
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C. Disaggregations
1. Validation rates. Table 6 breaks out the comparison of the D.C. Circuit and
other circuits by the ideological content of the agency decision. The patterns are
consistent with the previous tables. Most notably, the circuit groupings feature the
standard see-saw pattern in which the validation rates of Democratic appointees are
higher than those of Republican appointees when the agency decision is liberal—and
when the agency decision is conservative, the opposite pattern can be found. But this
pattern emerges most strongly outside of the D.C. Circuit.
For D.C. Circuit judges, the validation rates of Republican appointees appear
more responsive to the ideological content of the agency decision than those of their
Democratic colleagues. Panel A shows that when the agency decision is liberal rather
than conservative, the validation rates of Democratic appointees are merely 6 percentage
points higher. For Republican appointees on the D.C. Circuit, this difference is much
larger—nearly 20 percentage points!—and the movement in validation rates for these
Republican appointees is statistically significant. On the D.C. Circuit, Republican
appointees appear to show far more ideological voting than do Democratic appointees.
For judges on other circuits, the opposite is true. Panel B shows that when the
agency decision is liberal, Democratic appointees validate at a very high rate, 76%, and
when the agency decision is not liberal, their validation rate falls to 51%, a drop of 25
percentage points. The nature of the agency decision also has a sizable impact on the
validation rates of Republican appointees. Republican appointees on appellate courts
other than the D.C. Circuit vote to validate liberal agency decisions under hard look
review about 60% of the time and conservative decisions about 72% of the time. The
difference for Republican appointees outside the D.C. Circuit of 12 percentage points is
about half as large as the 25-point difference for Democratic appointees—but it is still
statistically significant.
In sum, the validation rates of Democratic and Republican appointees both inside
and outside of the D.C. Circuit appear to respond to the ideological direction of the
agency decisions. These responses produce the now-familiar see-sawing of validation
rates. Democratic appointees validate at higher rates than Republicans when the agency is
liberal, and vice-versa when the agency decision is conservative. A general conclusion is
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that the influence of judges’ political commitments on arbitrariness review is not limited
to any particular circuit court.
2. Liberal and Conservative Voting. A possible explanation for the lower
validation rates of D.C. Circuit judges is that they are simply more conservative than their
colleagues on other circuits. The relative lack of responsiveness of Democrats on the
D.C. Circuit to the ideological content of the agency decision—as shown in Table 5—
also suggests that Democratic appointees to that court may be more conservative than
Democratic appointees on other courts of appeals.
To test this hypothesis, Tables 7 presents comparisons for liberal voting rates. The
table reveals that in addition to having higher invalidation rates, D.C. Circuit judges—of
both parties—are significantly more conservative than judges of other circuits in their
voting patterns in arbitrariness cases. Republican appointees to the D.C. Circuit cast
liberal votes less often than their counterparts in other circuits by about 8 percentage
points. The difference for Democratic appointees is almost double that; the average
Democratic appointee to the D.C. Circuit casts liberal votes in these arbitrariness review
cases about 14% less often than Democrats in other circuits.
Yet the lower liberal voting rates of D.C. Circuit judges does not imply that
Democrats and Republicans on the D.C. Circuit are equally conservative. In both the
D.C. Circuit and other circuits, Democratic appointees vote in the liberal manner more
often than Republican appointees. This partisan gap about 9 percentage points in the D.C.
Circuit and 15 percentage points in other circuits, but the six-point difference between
these two figures is not statistically significant. We cannot conclude that the partisan gap
is larger on other circuits, but we readily infer that Democratic appointees on all appellate
courts cast liberal votes more often in arbitrariness review of EPA and NLRB decisions
than Republican appointees do. We will explore shortly a complexity with drawing some
tempting conclusions from this finding; for the moment, let us continue with the
numbers.
While a partisan gap remains within each circuit, the lower liberal voting rates of
Democratic appointees on the DC Circuit can be further illustrated by comparing them to
Republican appointees in other circuits. Put differently, does the average Democratic
appointee to the DC Circuit have liberal voting rates as low as the average Republican
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appointee to another circuit court? Table 7 shows, strikingly, that the answer is “yes.”
D.C. Circuit Democrats cast liberal votes 58% of the time, while Republicans on other
circuits did so 57% of the time. At least in terms of this set of arbitrariness review
opinions, D.C. Circuit Democrats behave like Republicans on other federal appellate
courts. A look back at Table 5 reveals that these two groups of judges are also
indistinguishable in terms of their validation rates in these cases. D.C. Circuit Democrats
voted to validate the agency decisions 62% of the time, while Republicans on other
circuits did so 61% of the time.
We have referred to a complexity in interpreting these findings, and it is easy to
describe: Relevantly different cases might be brought before the DC Circuit than before
other courts of appeals. In some cases, the DC Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review
EPA action, and pragmatic constraints might ensure that “liberal” challenges to agency
action are relatively weak and that “conservative” challenges to agency action are
relatively strong. In other cases, litigants might decide to bring particular cases in the DC
Circuit, or decide not to do so, and these selection effects might defeat easy comparisons.
We have therefore spoken of differences in liberal voting rates without drawing strong
conclusions about whether DC Circuit judges are more conservative in the abstract.
Because of the mix of cases in the DC Circuit is not a random sample, our evidence is
merely suggestive.
However this issue is best understood, the central lessons are plain. In cases
challenging EPA and NLRB decisions for arbitrariness, judges on the D.C. Circuit
invalidate agency decisions more readily than do their counterparts in other circuits. Both
Democratic and Republican appointees to the D.C. Circuit show lower liberal voting rates
than do their counterparts in other circuits. At the same time, the partisan gap between
Democratic and Republican appointees does not lessen: In both the D.C. and other
circuits, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes in arbitrariness review cases
significantly more often than Republican appointees. In terms of their liberal voting rates
in such cases, Democratic appointees to the D.C. Circuit are equivalent to Republican
appointees to other circuit courts.
V. Normative Issues
We now turn to normative issues. It is tempting to think that an understanding of
validation rates and of the role of judicial ideology would bear on and perhaps even
resolve the continuing debate over hard look review. And in the end, we conclude that
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our findings can reasonably be taken to suggest the importance of diminishing that role,
and also provide significant ammunition for those who believe that such review should be
softened.111 But this lesson is heavily qualified, and the qualifications may be as
important as the ultimate conclusion. The less ambiguous lesson is that it would be highly
desirable to reduce the role of judicial policy preferences in conducting arbitrariness
review.
A. Problems and Puzzles
Let us begin with the validation rate. In arbitrariness cases, the validation rate is
64 percent.112 Some people might find that rate alarmingly low. After all, agencies are
supposed to lose not when they are wrong but when their judgments of policy and fact are
“arbitrary” (or lacking substantial evidence). An invalidation rate of 36 percent seems
quite high.
To make progress on the normative issues, suppose we found that the validation
rate was lower than it actually is—say, 30 percent. Would it be appropriate to conclude
that the hard look doctrine was too hard? At first glance, the answer would clearly be
affirmative. If courts are striking down agency decisions as arbitrary more than half of
the time, there is reason to suspect that something is seriously amiss.
But for two reasons, the suspicion might turn out to be wrong. Perhaps more than
half of the agency decisions are, in fact, arbitrary. If so, the invalidation rate is nothing to
deplore. But there is a more subtle point. As we have suggested, the rate of challenges to
agency action will be affected by whether judicial review is aggressive or weak. If courts
are aggressive, we should expect to see more challenges, simply because the likelihood of
success is higher. If the rate of challenges varies with the stringency of judicial review,
then we might hypothesize that it would hover around a fairly constant level—as a first
approximation, 50% (not so far from the overall rate that we in fact find). In other words,
the rate of validations might be impervious to changes in the stringency of review.
To see why this is a plausible hypothesis, imagine that the stringency of judicial
review was reduced, in next five years, by about half—so that the validation rate would
111

See, e.g., Pierce, supra note.
We have explored NLRB and EPA cases here, but we have also compiled a different data set involving
all decisions citing State Farm, and including all such cases, the validation rate is under 60%.
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be 82%, all else equal, in five years. The difficulty is that the mix of cases would be most
unlikely to remain constant. If litigants are rational, the likelihood of success will affect
their decision whether to litigate, and that likelihood will depend on the aggressiveness of
arbitrariness review. In all likelihood, many challenges that would have been brought
would no longer be brought, simply because such challenges would be a waste of time
and money. Even if the stringency of judicial review were cut in half, the overall
validation rate could remain 64%. On certain assumptions about litigant behavior, less
stringent review could even produce a lower validation rate, if, for example, only very
strong cases were brought. (Hence the relatively higher validation rate for the EPA than
for the NLRB may tell us less than first appears.)
Actually things are more complicated still. Agency decisions should also be
affected by the likelihood of judicial invalidation. Consider the extreme case of no
review, at all, of agency judgments about policy and fact. Without any such review, some
agencies would inevitably make some decisions that they will not now make; the rate of
arbitrariness would significantly increase. Of course it is likely that arbitrary decisions
are already checked by nonjudicial safeguards of various sorts,113 and we could imagine a
world in which the level of arbitrariness would be very low even without judicial review.
But in our world, it is more than reasonable to think that judicial review operates to
discourage some decisions, actually or arguably arbitrary, that would be made in its
absence.114 If this is true, then it is also more than reasonable to think that aggressive
review will discourage more decisions than weak review. And if this is true, then
aggressive review will operate as a check on its own use. With such review, the mix of
agency decisions will shift in the direction of less arbitrariness, and hence the rate of
invalidation might well stay constant.
The analysis is analogous to that of the selection of disputes for litigation. In the
standard account, the only disputes that advance to trial are those in which each party is
sufficiently optimistic about her chance for success at trial that her estimated return from
trial exceeds the difference between trial costs and settlement costs. Less optimistic
113

Consider, for example, the process of internal executive branch review. See Stephen Breyer et al.,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 102-113 (6th ed. 2006).
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See William Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 84 Yale LJ 59 (1975) (contending
that aggressive judicial review has helped to discipline arbitrary decisions at EPA).
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litigants will choose to settle.115 Arbitrariness review differs in many ways from trials,
but the relevant insight is that both the rate of challenges to agency decisions and the
content of agency decisions will respond to the intensity of judicial review.
We can therefore identify two ways in which changes in the intensity of judicial
review will influence the case mix: As review becomes less intense, litigants will
challenge fewer decisions, and agencies will be more likely to make decisions that
aggressive courts would have struck down as arbitrary. In terms of validation rates, the
two effects will cut in different directions. Fewer challenges will mean higher validation
rates; agency adaptation, in the form of decisions closer to the line of arbitrariness, will
mean higher ones.
To know the ultimate consequences of less intense review, we need to know not
only the direction but also the magnitude of these two effects. A reduction in the intensity
of review should first tend to raise the validation rate. If neither litigants nor agencies are
responsive to the intensity of review, an increase in the validation rate would be the sole
consequence of less intense review. But if litigants were highly responsive to intensity
shifts and if agencies were not, the content of agency decisions would remain the same
while litigants would decline to bring the more marginal challenges. The volume of
arbitrariness challenges would decline, and the validation rate could remain fairly
constant. Or the validation rate could even fall as litigants found it worthwhile to
challenge only agency decisions that were most egregious and thus most likely to be
invalidated.
Suppose, however, that litigants were not responsive to intensity shifts and
agencies were highly responsive. If so, then agencies might issue more arbitrary decisions
without suffering a reduction in the validation rate and without inducing an increased
flow of challenges. But if the agency let the quality of its decisions decline too much, the
greater arbitrariness of decisions would eventually offset the reduction in the intensity of
judicial review. In this instance, the volume of challenges might rise and the validation
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rate fall. If both litigants and agencies are highly responsive to intensity shifts, the impact
on the quality of agency decisions, the volume of challenges, and the validation rate is far
from clear. Without strong assumptions about whether litigants or agencies are more
responsive to the intensity of judicial review, the impact on the validation rate is also hard
to foresee. These predictions are captured in the following table: [insert Table 8 about
here]
It follows that in the abstract, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the
stringency of review, and about whether existing practice is too lenient or too stringent,
from any particular validation rate. In the future, much progress might be made by
examining the rate of challenges to decisions by particular agencies or agencies in
general—an eminently feasible enterprise. What percentage of EPA rules are actually
challenged? Is the percentage higher now than it was five years ago, or ten years ago, or
fifteen years ago? Still more progress might be made by a qualitative assessment of the
nature and rationality of agency decisions over time—also feasible even if more difficult.
B. Republican Appointees, Democratic Appointees, and the Smoking Gun
At this point, the validation rates that we observe might be taken to be
insufficiently informative about whether courts are reviewing agency decisions too
aggressively. But we are particularly interested in party and panel effects, and we should
be able to learn more if we attend to the differences between Republican and Democratic
appointees. To focus the analysis, suppose that Republican appointees voted to invalidate
liberal agency decisions 90% of the time and to invalidate conservative agency decisions
10% of the time—and that Democratic appointees showed the opposite pattern. Or
suppose that Republican appointees showed an 80% validation rate during Republican
administrations and a 20% validation rate during Democratic administrations, and that
Democratic appointees showed a similar form of favoritism. At first glance, voting
patterns of this kind would suggest a serious problem in the real world of arbitrariness
review.
If these were the observed patterns, then we might be tempted to say that when an
agency decision is invalidated as arbitrary, it is not always because it is genuinely
arbitrary. On the contrary, it may well be because the court would have preferred the
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agency to do otherwise. At least this is so when Republican appointees vote to strike
down liberal decisions or those in Democratic administrations, and when Democratic
appointees vote to strike down conservative decisions or those in Republican
administrations.
Even here, however, it is necessary to be careful. Suppose that Republican
appointees strike down liberal agency decisions at a much higher rate than conservative
agency decisions. By itself, does this fact demonstrate bias? The answer is that it does
not. Perhaps liberal agency decisions are especially likely to be arbitrary. And if
Democratic appointees are peculiarly likely to strike down EPA decisions under
Republican presidents, it may be because such decisions are indeed arbitrary. After
finding an asymmetrical pattern of votes within any particular group of appointees, we
might well be suspicious of ideological bias on the part of the judiciary. But no such
suspicion has been vindicated by that kind of pattern.
The smoking gun, we think, is the see-saw pattern found in Table 1—the fact that
Republican validation rates jump from 58% to 72% when the agency decision becomes
conservative, just as the Democratic validation rates fall from 71% to 56% when the
agency decision becomes conservative. It cannot be the case that both camps are biasfree, simply responding to what any objective observer would deem arbitrary. The
existence of ideological amplification sharpens this claim. If Democratic appointees show
a greater rate of liberal voting when sitting with two Democratic appointees, and if
Republican appointees show a greater rate of conservative voting when sitting with two
Republican appointees, then something does seem seriously wrong.
To be sure, it is possible that one group is essentially neutral and right and that the
other group is not. But it would be surprising if this possibility could be confirmed by an
independent observer who was both neutral and right. The best conclusion is that in its
operation, arbitrariness review is significantly affected by the ideological dispositions of
federal judges, in a way that produces serious errors in light of the aspirations of State
Farm itself. Recall that the most fundamental justification of hard look review is that
with the grant of broad discretionary power to regulatory agencies, a firm judicial check
is necessary as a kind of second-best substitute for insistence on the safeguards of the
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original constitutional system.116 If the consequence of that firm check is to give effect to
the policy commitments of federal judges, the cure seems worse than the disease.
Notice, however, that our data show a large but not massive difference between
Republican and Democratic appointees. It is not as if Republican appointees have a 10
percent validation rate when the agency decision is liberal and a 90 percent validation
rate when the agency decision is conservative. On the contrary, Republican appointees
vote to validate most liberal agency decisions, and Democratic appointees vote to
validate most conservative agency decisions. A defender of the status quo, seeking to
minimize the role of judicial policy preferences, might respond with the suggestion that
the evidence is compatible with the view that State Farm has disciplined the judicial role,
ensuring as it has that Republican and Democratic appointees generally agree with one
another, and vote to validate agency decisions more often than whether they are coded as
liberal or conservative.
We strongly agree with this suggestion insofar as it is meant to suggest that our
data demonstrate that judicial ideology is not playing a dominant role, and that judicial
policy choices are not driving arbitrariness review. A crudely “realist” picture of existing
practice is wildly inconsistent with reality. Nonetheless, judicial policy preferences do
play a significant role, and in the difficult cases, it does seem to be driving actual
outcomes. Something is seriously amiss if Republican appointees are significantly more
likely to uphold liberal agency decisions than conservative agency decisions and if
Democratic appointees show the opposite pattern. We cannot rule out the possibility that
one group has it essentially right, but it is not possible that both groups have it essentially
right, and we suspect that errors can be found from both sides.
C. Too Few Invalidations? Of Suspicion and Loyalty
At this stage, politically motivated invalidations might seem to be the most serious
problem. But a different reading of our findings is imaginable. Perhaps the problem is not
that appointees of both parties vote, with some regularity, to invalidate decisions with
which they might be expected to be unsympathetic. Perhaps the real problem is that
appointees of both parties vote, with some regularity, to uphold the decisions of agencies
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with which they might be expected to be sympathetic. Perhaps the real problem,
uncovered by our data, is not politically-driven suspicion but instead politically-driven
loyalty or at least sympathy. On this view, what is most troubling, and what emerges as
the real story here, is the high rates of validation, by judges nominated by a president of
one or another party, of agency decisions which those judges might be expected to find
agreeable.
Nothing in our data excludes this possibility. If the challenged agency decisions
are often arbitrary, perhaps it is disturbing to see that Democratic appointees vote to
uphold liberal decisions and that Republican appointees vote to uphold conservative
decisions. Perhaps it is affirmatively desirable to find a high level of invalidations;
perhaps the correct rulings are those by Republican appointees of liberal decisions, and
by Democratic appointees of conservative decisions. In a world in which agency
arbitrariness is pervasive, politically-driven validations would indeed be the problem.
Even if this is the correct reading of the data, and if validations rather than
invalidations are the problem, the existing pattern of outcomes cannot be defended. If the
real world of arbitrariness review includes a significant degree of political voting, leading
to an unduly high validation rate, the appropriate correction is a “harder look,” in the
form of a general increase in judicial scrutiny. Moreover, we suspect that this is not the
appropriate correction. If Democratic appointees are striking down conservative decisions
at a higher rate than liberal decisions, and if Republican appointees are doing the same
with liberal decisions, it would be surprising to find that all or most of the invalidated
decisions are genuinely "arbitrary" within ordinary understandings of that term while also
finding that the validated decisions are genuinely not “arbitrary.” Most of the cases in our
data involve complex questions of fact and value on which reasonable people can differ.
But we do not deny the potential value of a more systematic inquiry into the possibility
that politically-driven validations are a real problem.
D. What Should Be Done? Of Decision Costs and Error Costs
How do our findings bear on the continuing debate over arbitrariness review117?
The first point is that questions about such review cannot be settled in the abstract.
117
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Imagine, for example, a parallel world in which agency decisions are almost never
arbitrary, and never especially harmful even when arbitrary. Imagine that in such a world,
judicial review of arbitrariness would produce more, not less, in the way of arbitrariness,
simply because judicial decisions are replete with bias and suffer from a lack of expertise
and accountability. In that world, there is no point to arbitrariness review. By hypothesis,
such review would make the situation worse rather than better. These are claims about
the costs of errors; perhaps arbitrariness review increases those costs. At the same time,
judicial review increases the costs of decisions, simply because it adds an additional
layer, and possibly more than that, of decisional burdens on all sides.
Some people, in some periods, have believed that the United States is not so far
from this imaginary world.118 At the very least, it is possible to find periods in which
prominent voices suggest that aggressive judicial review of agency judgments of policy
and fact is likely to cause serious problems.119 The New Deal period is a prominent
example120; the same is true of the period after the election of President Reagan.
At the same time, we could easily imagine another and quite different parallel
world, in which agency decisions are distinctly susceptible to the influences of selfinterested private groups, or otherwise a product of bias and confusion. In that world, we
might also suppose that federal courts would provide an important ex post corrective and
ex ante deterrent to biased and confused decisions.121 In such a world, stringent judicial
review of agency judgments of fact and policy would be easy to defend.
We can identity prominent voices, in prominent periods, suggesting that this
understanding is not so far from reality.122 The enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act was based on skepticism about agency bias and relative enthusiasm for
judicial review.123 Indeed, the post-New Deal strengthening of substantial evidence
review resulted from the Supreme Court’s recognition of Congress’ expression of a
“mood” in favor of a more aggressive approach from the courts.124 The rise of the hard
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look doctrine, in the 1960s and 1970s, was founded on similar assumptions about the
value of judicial review in correcting agency errors and bias.125 Fearful of agency
“capture,” prominent judges defended the doctrine as a method for increasing agency
accountability, by ensuring attention to the claims of a range of relevant interests, and
also of promoting the application of technical expertise to difficult problems.126 For their
part, skeptics pointed to the risk that hard look review would discourage agency
rulemaking and reflect judicial bias on the merits.127
Our own findings demonstrate that judicial commitments are playing a significant
role—and suggest the strong possibility that in many cases, judges are voting to
invalidate agency decisions as arbitrary when they would not do so if their own
predilections were otherwise. To the extent that this is so, there is a new argument for a
softer look—that is, one that would ensure that agency decisions would be invalidated, as
arbitrary, only when diverse judges could agree that they should be invalidated for that
reason. We have a degree of confidence in the result when liberal decisions are
invalidated by panels of RRR and RRD; we also have such confidence when conservative
decisions are invalidated by panels of DDR or DDD. The troublesome cases involve
invalidations that “fit” with the presumed ideology of the majority of judges on the
relevant panel.128 And indeed, we have found disturbing patterns of that kind on the
federal courts of appeals. But as we have acknowledged, it is also possible to be troubled
by validations that fit with the presumed ideology of that same majority of judges. We
might add that we have a degree of confidence in validations from DDR and DRR panels,
and from DDD and RRR panels that are inconsistent with political expectations—but that
there is room for concern when an RRR panel upholds a conservative decisions and when
a DDD panel upholds a liberal one.
It would therefore be possible to take our findings to support two different
positions. The first is that judicial review should generally be weakened, so as to diminish
the risk that invalidations reflect political commitments on the part of the relevant judges.
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The second is that steps should be taken to reduce the risks associated with potentially
partisan validations or invalidations—as, for example, when DDD panels regularly
uphold liberal agency decisions, and when RRR panels show a special willingness to
strike down such decisions. The second position seems to us more securely grounded in
the evidence. It is certainly possible to fear that a general softening of judicial review
would reduce a valuable ex post corrective and ex ante deterrent to arbitrary decisions—a
fear to which our data do not speak.
Our findings also generate a clear prediction. When a judiciary dominated by the
appointees of a Republican president reviews liberal agency decisions, or when a
judiciary dominated by Democratic appointees reviews conservative agency decisions,
the invalidation rate will increase. This prediction suggests that the debate over State
Farm should consider the temporal effects of judicial policy preferences. The life tenure
of federal judges implies that partisan imbalances in the appellate courts may persist for
long periods. An unbalanced federal judiciary might well act as a brake on agencies’
ability to implement the liberal or conservative policies of a new executive.129 The
intensity of arbitrariness review can conspire with the life tenure of judges to make the
effects of judicial ideology enduring.
It is not clear whether large-scale reforms are desirable. But several lessons do
seem plain. At a minimum, the argument for Supreme Court review is strengthened in
arbitrariness cases in which the outcome fits with the predicted ideological dispositions of
unified panels. So too, those circumstances present unusually strong arguments for en
banc review. A parallel lesson is more subtle and perhaps more important. If appellate
judges are made aware that the evidence suggests a degree of ideological voting in
arbitrariness review, perhaps that very awareness can operate as a kind of corrective or
inoculation. In fact our hope is that an understanding of the data, on the part of lawyers
and judges generally, might help to reduce the relevant effects in the future.
More generally, there might well be a fresh reason to revisit the current hard look,
as a means of reducing the risk that agency decisions will be deemed arbitrary simply
because judges do not agree with them on the merits. Remarkably, the Supreme Court has
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issued no major pronouncements about arbitrariness review since State Farm itself. Its
next encounter with the topic could provide a context for directing significant cautionary
notes to the courts of appeals.
We could also imagine more dramatic responses. Here as elsewhere, there is
reason to prefer mixed to unified panels, as a way of reducing the risk of ideologically
driven outcomes.130 In an important context, Congress has made exactly this choice,
ensuring that the independent agencies may have no more than a bare majority of
commissioners from the same political party.131 For example, the National Labor
Relations Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications
Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission must have at least two
Republican members (of five) under Democratic Presidents, and at least two Democratic
members under Republican presidents.132 This requirement might well operate to reduce
the risks of ideological outcomes that arise when adjudicative bodies are more unified.
Note that the NLRB is one of our two principal agencies in the current study, and that the
NLRB makes almost all of its law and policy through adjudication, construing the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.133 It may be worth considering steps that
would ensure mixed panels on appellate courts, at least in high-stakes cases involving
review of agency decisions for arbitrariness.
A more ambitious plan would enlist voting rules—by, for example, requiring
unanimous decisions for invalidation of agency rulings as arbitrary.134 We do not believe
that our data support such a plan; the extent of ideological voting cannot justify such a
dramatic departure from standard practices. But if unified panels are found, in the future,
to show highly ideological voting patterns, it would be important to take steps to ensure
that arbitrariness review does not amount, in practice, to Democratic or Republican
review.
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Conclusion
In State Farm, the Supreme Court attempted to establish a framework that would
check arbitrariness on the part of administrators who are often given broad discretionary
authority.135 Our principal goal here has been to investigate the real world of arbitrariness
review. We have found that the validation rate for the NLRB and the EPA is 64 percent.
This rate is remarkably close to the validation rate for similar cases under Chevron.
The more important finding is that Democratic appointees show a far higher rate
of liberal voting than do Republican appointees: 68% as opposed to 56%. When agency
decisions are liberal, Democratic appointees are far more likely to vote to uphold them
than when they are conservative. By contrast, Republican appointees are far more likely
to uphold conservative agency decisions than liberal agency decisions. Democratic
appointees show especially liberal voting patterns when sitting on all-Democratic panels;
Republican appointees show especially conservative voting patterns when sitting on allRepublican panels.
It follows that the political party of the appointing president is a fairly good
predictor how a judge will vote in cases involving arbitrariness review; but the political
party of the president who appointed the two other judges on the panel is also a strong
predictor. These conclusions might be taken to provide fresh support for those who seek
to soften arbitrariness review, or at least for those who seek to reduce the role of judicial
policy preferences in review of agency action. The hard-look doctrine is most plausibly
justified as a method for controlling the exercise of open-ended authority by regulatory
agencies. To the extent that the doctrine operates, in practice, as a method of substituting
judicial policy preferences for agency policy preferences, something is seriously wrong.
Whether or not general softening is in order, steps might be taken to reduce that risk that
judicial policy preferences are produced unjustified invalidations (and perhaps
validations).
But our emphasis has been empirical, not normative. The differences between
Republican and Democratic appointees are significant, but we have not found that
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judicial votes are politically driven. Recall that Republican appointees generally vote to
validate liberal agency decisions and that Democratic appointees generally vote to
validate conservative agency decisions. For this reason, it would be far too simple to say
that the hard look is operationalized in purely political terms; our evidence is inconsistent
with that conclusion. But it would not be too much to say that in important domains, the
hard look is hardened, or softened, by the political predilections of federal judges.
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Figure 1.
Validation Rates of Circuit Judges in Arbitrariness Review Case,
by Agency and by Party of Appointing President
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the lightly shaded
bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.
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Figure 2.
Validation Rates of Circuit Judges in Arbitrariness Review Case,
by Panel Composition and by Party of Appointing President
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the lightly shaded
bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.
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Figure 3.
Liberal Voting Rates of Circuit Judges in Arbitrariness Review Case,
by Panel Composition and by Party of Appointing President
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Note: The darkly shaded bars indicate the validation rates of Republican appointees, and the lightly shaded
bars indicate the validation rates of Democratic appointees.
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Table 1
Validation Rates of Circuit Court Judges by Party of Appointing President
in Arbitrariness Review Cases: Total and by Ideological Content of Agency Decision
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Total
(1)
.619
(.016)
[861]

Ideological Content of Agency Decision:
Liberal
Not Liberal
Difference of
(2)
(3)
(2) –(3):
.710
.556
.155***
(.017)
(.048)
(.047)
[753]
[108]

(B) Republican

.597
(.015)
[1,098]

.584
(.016)
[987]

.721
(.043)
[111]

-.137**
(.049)

Difference of (A)—(B):

.094***
(.022)

.127***
(.023)

-.165**
(.064)

--

Party of Appointing President
(A) Democrat

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, ** denotes difference significant at 5% level, and ***
denotes difference significant at 1% level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Table 2
Validation Rates of Circuit Court Judges
by Party of Appointing and Current President in Arbitrariness Review Cases.
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Party of Current President:
Republican
Difference of
(3)
(2) –(3):
.700
-.016
(.023)
(.032)
[406]

Total
(1)
.691
(.016)
[861]

Democratic
(2)
.684
(.024)
[455]

(B) Republican

.597
(.015)
[1,098]

.565
(.020)
[589]

.635
(.021)
[509]

-.069**
(.030)

Difference of (A)—(B):

.094***
(.022)

.118***
(.030)

.065**
(.031)

--

Party of Appointing President
(A) Democrat

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, ** denotes difference significant at 5% level, and ***
denotes difference significant at 1% level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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Table 3
Validation Rates in Arbitrariness Review Cases by
Party of Appointing President, by Ideological Content of the Agency
Decision, and by Panel Composition
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)
Panel
Composition
DDD

Total
(1)
.713
(.034)
[174]

Ideological Content of Agency Decision:
Liberal
Not Liberal
Difference of
(2)
(3)
(2) –(3):
.748
.519
.230**
(.036)
(.098)
(.084)
[147]
[27]

(B) Democrat

DDR or
RRD

.686
(.018)
[687]

.701
(.019)
[606]

.568
(.055)
[81]

.133**
(.055)

( C) Republican

DDR or
RRD

.620
(.017)
[772]

.612
(.019)
[691]

.691
(.052)
[81]

-.079
(.057)

(D) Republican

RRR

.543
(.028)
[326]

.517
(.029)
[296]

.800
(.074)
[30]

-.283**
(.094)

Difference of (A)—(B):

--

.027
(.039)

.047
(.042)

.049
(.111)

--

Difference of (A)—(C):

--

.092**
(.040)

.136**
(.043)

-.173*
(.106)

--

Difference of (A)—(D):

--

.170**
(.045)

.231***
(.048)

-.281**
(.122)

--

Difference of (B)—( C):

--

.065**
(.025)

.089***
(.026)

-.123*
(.076)

--

Difference of (B)—(D):

--

.143***
(.032)

.184***
(.033)

.232**
(.107)

--

Difference of ( C)–(D):

--

.078**
(.032)

.095**
(.034)

.107
(.096)

--

Party of Judge
(A) Democrat

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, ** denotes difference significant at 5% level, and ***
denotes difference significant at 1% level.
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Table 4
Liberal Vote Rates of Circuit Court Appointees by
Party of Appointing and Current President in Arbitrariness Review Cases.
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)

Judge’s Party:
(A) Democrat

Total
(1)
.677
(.016)
[861]

President’s Party:
Democratic
Republican
(2)
(3)
.648
.709
(.022)
(.023)
[455]
[406]

Difference of
(2) –(3):
-.061*
(.032)

(B) Republican

.553
(.015)
[1,098]

.526
(.021)
[589]

.583
(.022)
[509]

-.057*
(.030)

Difference of
(A)—(B):

.124***
(.022)

.122***
(.031)

.126***
(.032)

--

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, ** denotes difference significant at 5% level, and ***
denotes difference significant at 1% level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Table 5
Validation Rates in Arbitrariness Review Cases by
Party of Appointing President and Circuit
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)

Party of Appointing President
(A) Democrat

District of
Columbia
(2)
.622
(.029)
[286]

Circuit Court of Appeals:
All Other
Difference of
Circuits
(2) –(3):
(3)
.725
-.067*
(.019)
(.034)
[575]

(B) Republican

.547
(.030)
[274]

.614
(.017)
[824]

-.103**
(.033)

Difference of (A)—(B):

.075*
(.042)

.111***
(.026)

--

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, ** denotes difference significant at 5% level, and ***
denotes difference significant at 1% level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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Table 6
Validation Rates in Arbitrariness Review Cases by
Party of Appointing President, Ideological Content of Agency Decision, and Circuit
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)
A. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Party of Appointing President
(A) Democrat

Ideological Content of Agency Decision:
Liberal
Not Liberal
Difference of
(2)
(3)
(2) –(3):
.616
.677
.062
(.031)
(.085)
(.092)
[255]
[31]

(B) Republican

.525
(.032)
[242]

.719
(.081)
[32]

-.194**
(.093)

Difference of (A)—(B):

.091**
(.044)

-.041
(.117)

--

B. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals

Party of Appointing President
(A) Democrat

(B) Republican

Difference of (A)—(B):

Ideological Content of Agency Decision:
Liberal
Not Liberal
Difference of
(2)
(3)
(2) –(3):
.759
.506
.253***
(.019)
(.057)
(.054)
[498]
[77]
.603
(.018)
[745]

.722
(.051)
[79]

-.119**
(.058)

.156***
(.027)

-.215**
(.076)

--

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, ** denotes difference significant at 5% level, and ***
denotes difference significant at 1% level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.
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Table 7
Liberal Voting Rates in Arbitrariness Review Cases by
Party of Appointing President and Circuit
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets)

Party of Appointing President
(A) Democrat

District of
Columbia
(2)
.584
(.029)
[286]

Circuit Court of Appeals:
All Other
Difference of
Circuits
(2) –(3):
(3)
.723
.140***
(.019)
(.034)
[575]

(B) Republican

.496
(.030)
[274]

.572
(.017)
[824]

.075**
(.035)

Difference of (A)—(B):

.088**
(.042)

.152**
(.026)

--

Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, ** denotes difference significant at 5% level, and ***
denotes difference significant at 1% level. Differences may not match exactly due to rounding.

Table 8
Effects of Reduced Intensity of Judicial Review on Validation Rates

Are the Litigants Responsive?
Yes

No

Is the Agency Responsive?
Yes
No
Ambiguous impact on
No change (or lower
validation rate
validation rate)
No change (or lower
validation rate)
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Higher validation rate
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